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Abstract. Recent work has presented max-equivocation as a measure
of the resistance of a cryptosystem to attacks when the attacker is aware
of the encoder function and message distribution. Here we consider the
vulnerability of a cryptosystem in the one-try attack scenario when the
attacker has incomplete information about the encoder function and mes-
sage distribution. We show that encoder functions alone yield informa-
tion to the attacker, and combined with inferable information about the
ciphertexts, information about the message distribution can be discov-
ered. We show that the whole encoder function need not be fixed or
shared a priori for an effective cryptosystem, and this can be exploited
to increase the equivocation over an a priori shared encoder. Finally we
present two algorithms that operate in these scenarios and achieve good
equivocation results, ExPad that demonstrates the key concepts, and
ShortPad that has less overhead than ExPad.
1 Introduction
The privacy of private communication is a fundamental concern of contempo-
rary computer science. Approaches in this area can be divided into two cat-
egories: computation and unconditional security. Computation security relies
upon the (assumed) superpolynomial lower bound of computational complex-
ity for some particular functions, e.g. factorization. These lower-bound results
are unproven, and are susceptible to advances in algorithmic theory, quantum
computing [1], or engineering [2]. Unconditional security is instead based upon
information-theoretic results and proven independently of computational hard-
ness or techniques. Thus unconditional security results are both more general
and theoretically solid than computational security results.
Initial formal results on unconditional security began with Shannon [3] using
key concepts from the formal theory of communication [4]. Shannon considered
the transmission of an encrypted message on a public channel between a sender
and a receiver that share a cryptographic key. The results formalized that to
achieve perfect secrecy, where the attacker gains no information about the mes-
sage, the cryptographic key space must be as large as the message space. Further,
the keys must be uniformly distributed over the key space, and the key can be
used only once.
In [5] max-equivocation was presented as a measure of unconditional secu-
rity that generalizes perfect secrecy. Max-equivocation measures the resistance
of a cryptosystem to attacks from an unconditional attacker, in particular the
bounds that can be achieved with a key space smaller than the message space,
and also scenarios where the key space is not uniformly distributed. This is done
over encoder functions for shared-key cryptosystems where the encoder function
and message distribution are known to the attacker. Here we consider the im-
plications of these assumptions, in particular when relaxing them. However, we
will always consider that the attacker has the same information that the receiver
has, except for the value of the key to avoid our results being reliant on security
through obscurity.
When the attacker does not know the actual distribution of messages gener-
ated then alternative approaches are required to compute the vulnerability of the
cryptosystem. To this end we define relative vulnerability that is able to quan-
tify the vulnerability when the attacker’s distribution over the messages does
not match that of the message generation. It turns out that when considering
one-try attacks (min-entropy [6]) that the vulnerability of the system can only
decrease when the attacker does not know the generator’s distribution. That is,
an attacker using the wrong distribution can never do better than knowing the
generators distribution.
Another path of attack is to consider the information yielded by an encoder
function alone. It turns out that knowing an encoder function can yield signif-
icant information to an attacker. To formalise this we present a representation
of an encoder function as a matrix. The rank of this matrix can be exploited to
discover information about the message distribution. In particular, if the rank is
maximal then given the distribution over the ciphertexts it is straightforward to
determine the message distribution. Conversely, for each rank short of maximal
(or each degree of freedom) there is an infinitude of possible message distribu-
tions.
It is then natural to consider the attacker’s ability to determine the generated
message distribution by observing ciphertexts and exploiting the encoder func-
tion. We show that determining the ciphertext frequency is straighforward, and
that this can be combined with knowledge of the encoder function to converge
on some reasonable message distribution. Additionally when the encoder func-
tion’s matrix representation has maximal rank then the attacker can uniquely
determine the generators message distribution. Even when the encoder function’s
matrix representation does not have maximal rank, the attacker can refine their
knowledge of the message distribution via these techniques to converge on a
distribution closer to that of the generator. These results make it clear that
merely maximising equivocation is not sufficient when the attacker does not al-
ready know the generator’s message distribution. Indeed it may be better to
reduce equivocation slightly and so introduce uncertainty for the attacker over
the message distribution.
Building on this knowledge, we consider the scenario where the sender may
wish to transmit only the minimal information required to decode the message.
Here it is sufficient for the sender to transmit only a small part of an encoder
(or decoder) function that will allow the receiver to determine the message. To
this end we introduce a curried decoder function that is the minimal amount
of the encoder function required to decode the message. Interestingly, this does
not require the fixing of an encoder function a priori, and so the sender can
craft an encoder function to yield good information-theoretic results for the
particular message to be sent. However, a naive approach to this can lead to
leaking information to the attacker, and so the choice of encoder function must
be made with some care.
We present the ExPad algorithm that can achieve excellent equivocation
and good overall leakage properties by considering the above results. This is
achieved by combining knowledge of the generator’s message distribution with
some randomness that selects a sub-set of the messages with similar probabilities.
A curried decoder function is then sent that contains these messages as its image
and with the key mapping to the original message. We formalize that ExPad
has good leakage properties and is reasonable to implement. However, ExPad
requires sending an amount of information linear in the size of the key space.
To improve upon this we present the ShortPad algorithm that reduces the
information sent to be logarithmic in the size of the key space. This is achieved
by exploiting an operation that treats the elements of the message space as a
group. A pad is chosen that is a sub-set of the message space, and then the
bit string representation of the key is used to choose a subset of this pad to be
combined with the operation. The choice of pad can be made to have elements
with similar probability in the image, yielding similar equivocation results to
ExPad. Further, by exploiting the bit string representation of the key and the
pad the transmission is logarithmic in the size of the key space rather than
linear. Indeed, ShortPad can also be used with pre-agreed pads and operations
to further reduce the required transmission from sender to receiver.
Main Contributions This paper contributes the following main results.
– We introduce relative vulnerability, a distance measure between probability
distributions that corresponds to the difference in min-entropy leakage if
the attacker assumes a message distribution different from the real message
distribution.
– We prove that using an incorrect message distribution is never beneficial for
the attacker in one-try attack scenarios.
– We prove that the information inferred by the attacker on the message dis-
tribution depends on the rank of the matrix representation of the encoder
function.
– We show how the attacker can infer the ciphertext distribution and use it to
gain information about the message distribution.
– We analyze the equivocation in the scenario where the sender crafts and
transmits curried decoder functions optimized for particular messages, thus
avoiding revealing the full encoder function, and quantify the security of this
approach.
– We present the ExPad algorithm to securely construct and transmit curried
decoder functions and prove its effectiveness.
– We present the ShortPad algorithm achieving similar security results to
ExPad while transmitting logarithmic rather than linear amounts of infor-
mation. We show that ShortPad can reduce this further to be a constant
albeit with worse leakage results.
Related Work Information-theoretic analysis of shared-key cryptosystems was
introduced by Shannon [4, 3], including the concepts of entropy, equivocation,
and perfect secrecy. Max-equivocation was introduced by Biondi et al. [5, 7]
considering only the case in which the encoder and message distribution are
known to the attacker. This work extends the same analysis to the case where
the attacker does not possess this knowledge.
Min-entropy was introduced by Smith [6] as an information-theoretic mea-
sure of information leakage for one-try attack scenarios. Note that min-entropy
leakage is a measure of secrecy, i.e. difference between the attacker’s knowledge
before and after observation of the system’s output, while equivocation is a mea-
sure of the resistance of the system after the observation.
Min-entropy leakage is based on vulnerability, i.e. the probability of success of
a one-try attack and the complement of Bayes risk. Min-entropy leakage has been
generalized to arbitrary gain functions as g-leakage [8], and its induced ordering
on channels has been extensively studied [9]. Strong and weak concepts of perfect
secrecy based only on vulnerability have been studied [10]. Additive measures of
information leakage have been proposed for the one-try attack scenario [11, 12].
Clarkson et al. [13] model the accuracy of the attacker’s information about
the message as the relative entropy from the attacker’s distribution to the real
message distribution, and Hamadou et al. [14] follow the same principle to de-
rive bounds on the vulnerability of a system against an attacker with incorrect
information. Contrarily to their approach, we compute a direct measure of the
vulnerability of the system against an attacker with incorrect information.
Structure of the Paper The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2
recalls background material. Section 3 presents relative vulnerability and its re-
lation to min-entropy leakage. Section 4 discusses how the message distribution
can be inferred from the encoder function by exploiting a matrix representa-
tion and considering the rank. Section 5 explains how the attacker can infer
the ciphertext distribution and use it to gain information about the message
distribution. Section 6 considers transmitting only a curried decoder function
to the receiver to hide the full encoder function, and quantifies the information
leakage to the attacker. Section 7 presents ExPad, an effective transmission al-
gorithm based on the results of this paper. Section 8 presents ShortPad, an
algorithm almost as secure as ExPad transmitting only a logarithmic amount
of data compared to ExPad. Section 9 concludes and considers future work.
2 Background
We recall standard definitions and concepts that will be used throughout this
work.
The size of a set S is denoted as |S|. A function f : A → B is injective iff
∀a1, a2 ∈ A. f(a1) = f(a2)⇒ a1 = a2.
Basic concepts from probability and information theory can be found in the
literature [15], including the definitions of support set X , probability P (E) of
an event E ⊆ X , random variable X on X , entropy H(X) of a random variable,
and so on. We will write ρX (X) for a probability distribution on the random
variable X on the support set X , abbreviated to ρ(X) when the support set is
unambiguous.
2.1 Shared-Key Cryptosystems
We recall the definition of a shared-key cryptosystem, components, and typi-
cal use as the basis for the results and scenarios in this paper. A shared-key
cryptosystem can be defined by the following components [7].
Definition 1. A (shared-key) cryptosystem is a 3-tuple (M,K, enc) where:
– the message space M is a finite set of possible messages;
– the key space K is a finite set of possible keys;
– the encoder enc is a function M×K → C to some space C such that ∀k ∈
K. enc(·, k) is injective.
A shared-key cryptosystem induces a ciphertext space C = enc[M,K] as the
image of its encoder function and a decoder function as a function dec : C×K →
M such that dec(enc(m, k), k) = m. The existence and uniqueness of such a
decoder function is ensured by the requirement that enc(·, k) is injective.
The channel model of a cryptosystem was introduced by Shannon [3]. In this
model, the sender wants to send a message m ∈ M to the receiver on a public
channel that is eavesdropped by an attacker. Initially, the sender and receiver
share a secret key k ∈ K.
The sender encodes the message m with key k into the ciphertext c as c =
enc(m, k). The sender then sends c to the receiver via a public channel, where
c is also eavesdropped by the attacker. Knowing the key k, the receiver decodes
the message m = dec(c, k) using the decoder function. Not knowing the key k,
the attacker tries to infer m from c. The computational power available to the
sender, receiver and attacker is assumed to be unlimited.
The attacker’s knowledge about the elements of the communication is mod-
eled by random variables. Let M (resp. K, C) be a random variable on the
support set M (resp. K, C) representing the value of the message m (resp. key
k, ciphertext c) according to the attacker.
2.2 Information-Theoretic Analysis
We recall min-entropy leakage as a measure of the vulnerability of a system.
Min-entropy leakage was proposed by Smith [6] to quantify the vulnerability of
a system against an attacker that, after observing the system’s output, has one
attempt to guess the value of the systems’ secret, this is known as a one-try
attack scenario. In a shared-key cryptosystem scenario the secret is the message
m and the observable is the ciphertext c.
Let M be a random variable representing a secret value and ρ the probability
distribution on its supportM modeling the attacker’s a priori information about
the message. Let C be the random variable representing the ciphertext observed
by the attacker.
Since the attacker has only one attempt to guess the secret message, they will
guess the message with the highest probability according to their distribution.
When multiple messages have the same highest probability, one of them is chosen
uniformly at random.
Then the vulnerability of the message is the probability that the attacker’s
guess will be correct:
V (M) = max
m∈M
ρ(m)
and the conditional vulnerability of M after observing C is
V (M |C) =
∑
c∈C
ρ(c) max
m∈M
ρ(m|c) .
It is standard to transform vulnerability into entropy and so be able to quantify
the difference in bits. The prior min-entropy of the message is
H∞(M) = − log V (M)
while the conditional min-entropy or min-entropy equivocation is
H∞(M |C) = − log V (M |C)
and the min-entropy leakage is the difference of the two:
L∞(M,C) = H∞(M)−H∞(M |C) .
Observe that the conditional min-entropy represents the information after c has
been observed.
Min-entropy is designed to capture the change in the probability that the
attacker will be able to guess the value of the secret in one attempt.
Since the key is also unknown to the attacker, the key’s vulnerability and
min-entropy can also be computed. Note that since the message and key are
chosen independently, then H∞(M,K) = H∞(M) +H∞(K).
Shannon defined perfect secrecy as the highest possible security condition
attainable by a cryptosystem [3]. It corresponds to the leakage being zero.
Definition 2 (Perfect Secrecy). A cryptosystem attains perfect secrecy in
the one-try attack scenario iff
L∞(M,C) = 0.
Shannon also proved that for a cryptosystem to be perfectly secure it is nec-
essary that the key space is at least as large as the message space, i.e. |K| ≥ |M|,
making perfect secrecy hard to achieve in practice. Instead, max-equivocation [7]
has been proposed as the highest possible security condition that is attainable
by any cryptosystem, including when |K| < |M|:
Definition 3 (Max-Equivocation). A cryptosystem attains max-equivocation
in the one-try attack scenario iff H∞(M |C) = H∞(K).
2.3 Beta and Dirichlet Distributions
The Beta (resp. Dirichlet) distribution can be used to infer the parameters of
a binomial (resp. multinomial) distribution from a number of samplings of the
distribution. The Beta (resp. Dirichlet) distribution assigns a random variable to
each of the elements in the support of a binomial (resp. multinomial) distribution,
and the expected value of this random variable converges to the probability of the
element. We exploit this later in the paper by using Dirichlet results to converge
upon a distribution based upon observations, e.g. the attacker can converge upon
the ciphertext distribution by observations of a sufficient number of ciphertexts.
We present the key notations and components of Beta and Dirichlet distri-
butions, but do not revisit the well known results. For greater detail we refer to
the literature [16], and for those who are interested only in the results of this
paper the details may be intuitively presented in the results.
A Beta distribution is parameterized over two non-negative parameters α
and β.
Definition 4. The Beta(α, β) distribution with parameters (α, β) defined on
x ∈ [0, 1] has probability density function
f(x) =
xα−1(1− x)β−1
B(α, β)
where
B(α, β) =
∫ 1
0
xα−1(1− x)β−1dx
is the Beta function on two parameters.
To generalize the two-parameter Beta distribution to the multi-parameter
Dirichlet distribution, we need to introduce a simplex for the probability space
over possible multinomial distributions.
Definition 5. Let a (q − 1)-dimensional probability simplex ∆q be the surface
in Rq whose q components {x1, . . . , xq} are greater than zero and sum up to one:
∆q =
{
x ∈ Rq | 1 =
q∑
i=1
xi ∧ xi ≥ 0
}
.
A Dirichlet distribution is a probability distribution over the probability
simplex ∆q. The distribution is parameterized over q parameters {α1, . . . , αq}.
Definition 6. Let X = [X1, . . . , Xq] be a vector of q random variables such
that Xq = 1 −
∑q−1
i=1 Xi and Xi ≥ 0 for i = 1, . . . , q. Then X has a Dirichlet
distribution with parameters {α1, . . . , αq} if the probability mass function of X
is
X ∼ Dir(α) = 1
B(α)
q∏
i=1
xαi−1i
where
B(α) =
∏q
i=1 Γ (αi)
Γ (
∑q
i=1 αi)
, α = (α1, · · · , αq)
and Γ is the gamma function.
Let α0 =
∑q
i=1 αi. Then the marginal distribution on each Xi is Beta(αi, α0 −
αi), its expectation is
E[Xi] =
αi
α0
and its variance is
V ar[Xi] =
αi(α0 − αi)
α20(α0 + 1)
.
The Dirichlet distribution is the conjugate prior of the parameters of the
multinomial distribution, meaning that if (Y |x) ∼ Multinomialq(n, x) and X ∼
Dir(α) then (X|Y = y) ∼ Dir(α + y). Importantly, the Dirichlet distribution
can be used for inference of a multinomial distribution, since if the distribution is
updated with samplings of a multinomial distribution ρ over outcomes xi, . . . , xq
then each expectation E[Xi] converges almost surely and in mean to ρ(xi).
3 Relative Vulnerability
This sections considers the entropy/vulnerability that occurs depending upon
the distribution used by the attacker. The results in this section depend on the
definition of vulnerability and min-entropy used in the one-try attack scenario,
and do not necessarily generalize to other entropy measures and scenarios.
To simplify the notation we define the maximums Mρ and minimums Mρ
as sets of elements of another setM for a given probability distribution ρ (with
domain M) as follows
Mρ = {m ∈M . ∀m′ ∈M . ρ(m) ≥ ρ(m′)}
Mρ = {m ∈M . ∀m′ ∈M . ρ(m) ≤ ρ(m′)} .
Note that each element in Mρ (resp. Mρ) has the same probability; we will
denote this probability as ρ(mρ) (resp. ρ(mρ)).
Given two probability distributions ρG and ρA on the same domain we can
consider a metric for their distance that aligns with min-entropy guessing at-
tackers. Here ρG can be thought of as a generator for the elements m ∈ M
or the true probability. Thus ρA can be considered the probability according
to the attacker. Intuitively this is the vulnerability if the attacker’s probability
ρA is used to guess when ρG is the actual probability distribution. Let MρA
be partitioned into the sets M\ = MρA \MρG of the wrong guesses of A and
M∩ =MρA ∩MρG of the right guesses of A.
Note that the vulnerability of the message is written V (M) implicitly assum-
ing that there is a single probability distribution ρ(M) overM. In this section we
are considering two different distributions ρG(M) and ρA(M) on the same set of
messages, so we will write the corresponding vulnerabilities V (G)
.
= V (ρG(M))
and V (A)
.
= V (ρA(M)) for readability.
Definition 7. The relative vulnerability of ρG using ρA δ(G  A) is defined as
follows
δ(G  A) = ∑
m∈M\
ρG(m
ρG)− ρG(m)
|MρA | .
The definition above implicitly assumes that when the attacker has multiple
possible max-probability outcomes to choose from, they will choose one of them
at random with uniform probability. This is justified by the fact that, since such
outcomes have the same probability in ρA, the attacker has no information to
prefer any of them over the others, so he chooses one of them at random following
the Maximum Entropy Principle.
Some Properties of δ(G  A)
This section formalizes some properties of relative vulnerability.
Lemma 1. 0 ≤ δ(G  A) ≤ ρG(mρG)− ρG(mρG) with
– equality to the left iff M\ = ∅; and
– equality to the right iff ∀m ∈MρA .ρG(m) = ρG(mρG).
The following corollaries immediately follow:
Corollary 1. If ρG is the uniform distribution then δ(G  A) for all ρA is 0.
Corollary 2. 0 ≤ δ(G  A) ≤ 1.
Importantly, relative vulnerability has the property of being equivalent to
the loss of vulnerability when using the distribution ρA to guess the secret of
a system that is generated with distribution ρG. Let’s define the vulnerability
V (G  A) of a system with distribution ρG when the attacker uses distribution
ρA:
Definition 8. The vulnerability V (G  A) of ρG using ρA is
1
|MρA |
|M∩|ρG(mρG) + ∑
m∈M\
ρG(m)
 .
Lemma 2. V (G)− δ(G  A) = V (G  A)
The concept of relative vulnerability can be easily extended to conditional
probabilities and vulnerabilities:
Definition 9. The relative vulnerability δ(G  A|X) of ρG using ρA given X
is defined as follows
δ(G  A|X) = ∑
x∈X
ρG(x)δ(G|x  A|x) .
Similarly we can define the vulnerability V (G  A) of a secret with distri-
bution ρG when the attacker uses distribution ρA after observing X:
Definition 10. The vulnerability V (G  A|X) of G using A after observing X
is
V (G  A|X) = ∑
x∈X
ρG(x)V (G|x  A|x)
and the following lemma holds:
Lemma 3. V (G|X)− δ(G  A|X) = V (G  A|X)
We can use the results in this section to prove that if an attacker tries to
guess a message generated by a distribution ρG while instead using distribution
ρA after observing a variable X, the resulting min-entropy equivocation H∞(G 
A|X) is greater than or equal to the min-entropy equivocation H∞(G|X) ob-
tained by using the distribution ρG, with equality iff δ(G  A|X) = 0.
Theorem 1.
H∞(G  A|X) ≥ H∞(G|X)
with equality iff δ(G  A|X) = 0.
Note that extending Theorem 1 to scenarios other than one-try attacks re-
quires reasoning about the appropriate definitions of vulnerability. We refer to
Ko¨pf and Basin [17] for discussion of the connection between scenarios and un-
certainty measures.
4 Encoder Rank
This section considers the information the attacker can gain merely from the
encoder function a priori.
Observe that from the encoder function the message space M and the key
space K can be inferred. Further, some properties of the message distribution can
also be inferred from the encoder function. For example, consider the encoder
functions for |M| = 3 and |K| = 2 in Table 1, reprinted from [5].
The encoder function in Table 1a induces the constraints ρ(m1) = 1− 2ρ(c3)
and ρ(m2) = 1 − 2ρ(c1). Similarly, Table 1b induces ρ(m1) = ρ(c1) + ρ(c4)
Table 1: Encoder functions for |M| = 3 and |K| = 2.
Message
m1 m2 m3
K
e
y k1 c1 c2 c3
k2 c2 c3 c1
(a) A Latin rectangle encoder
Message
m1 m2 m3
K
e
y k1 c1 c2 c3
k2 c4 c3 c2
(b) A non-Latin rectangle encoder
and ρ(m2) + ρ(m3) = ρ(c2) + ρ(c3). Naturally, in both cases we know that
ρ(m1)+ρ(m2)+ρ(m3) = 1 since ρ is a probability distribution over the messages.
We now introduce a convenient form to extract the constraints from the
encoder function.
Definition 11. The ciphertext matrix form of an encoder function is a |C|×|M|
matrix C defined as
C(i, j) = ρ(ci|mj) =
∑
k∈K
ρ(ci, k|mj)
Fig. 1: Ciphertext matrix forms for the encoder functions in Table 1
C =

m1 m2 m3
c1 ρ(k1) 0 ρ(k2)
c2 ρ(k2) ρ(k1) 0
c3 0 ρ(k2) ρ(k1)

(a) Ciphertext matrix forms for the en-
coder function in Table 1a
C =

m1 m2 m3
c1 ρ(k1) 0 0
c2 0 ρ(k1) ρ(k2)
c3 0 ρ(k2) ρ(k1)
c4 ρ(k2) 0 0

(b) Ciphertext matrix forms for the en-
coder function in Table 1b
The ciphertext matrix forms for the encoder functions in Table 1a and 1b
are depicted in Figure 1a and 1b, respectively.
The ciphertext matrix form C can be seen as the coefficient matrix of a
system of equations. Each row i in the augmented matrix represents the equation
ρ(ci) = ρ(ci|m1)ρ(m1) + · · ·+ ρ(ci|m|M|)ρ(mM)
where the ρ(ci|mj) are the coefficients, the ρ(mj) are the variables, and ρ(ci) is
the constant. Thus each row i corresponds to the equation ρ(ci) =
∑
m∈M ρ(ci,m).
The equation
∑
m∈M ρ(m) = 1 can be added to the system to represent the
probability distribution constraint.
Since C is derived directly from the encoder function and we are assuming
that the attacker knows the encoder function, then the attacker can compute C
before observing any ciphertexts.
The number of solutions of the system depend on the rank rank(C) of C.
We will refer to the rank of the ciphertext matrix form of an encoder function
as rank of the encoder for brevity. We will show that the rank is an important
property of the encoder since it defines the number of degrees of freedom of the
message probability distribution according to the attacker. Consequently, among
two encoder functions achieving similar equivocation, the one with the smallest
rank should be preferred, since it will be more effective in hiding the message
distribution from the attacker.
Recall by the Rouche´-Capelli theorem that the number of solutions of the
system of constraints has |M| − rank(C) degrees of freedom. The following
theorem is an immediate consequence.
Theorem 2. The number of possible message distributions inferred by the at-
tacker from the observation of ciphertexts is an infinitude with |M| − rank(C)
degrees of freedom.
Corollary 3. If |M| = rank(C) then the attacker can infer the exact message
distribution from the observation of ciphertexts.
Note that in general the rank of the matrix depends on the key distribution.
Given a fixed distribution on the key space, the system of equations has at
least one solution, i.e. where the probabilities of the messages correspond to the
generator’s distribution. Consequently, the rank of the coefficient matrix and the
rank of the augmented matrix coincide by the Rouche´-Capelli theorem.
5 Inferring Distributions
This section considers the capability of the attacker to infer the message or
key distributions by observing the ciphertexts. The constraints from the en-
coder function can be combined with the ciphertext distribution to produce the
augmented matrix. The attacker can use this information to converge upon a
message distribution. Of course if the matrix has any degrees of freedom then
there are infinite possible message distributions that can satisfy the constraints,
and the attacker can only converge to one of these. The rest of this section builds
up to these results.
For this section we assume that the attacker has access to the ciphertexts as
well as the encoder function.
The base case to consider is when the attacker has access to the messages
themselves. We show that in this case the attacker can determine the generator’s
probability distribution over the message space.
We take that X = {X1, . . . , X|M|} is a vector of random variables where
each random variable Xi for 1 ≤ i ≤ |M| − 1 represents the probability of
the message mi and X|M| = 1 −
∑|M|−1
i=1 Xi. Let oi be the number of times
that message mi has been observed by the attacker and o the total number of
messages observed. Then the attacker can use a Dirichlet distribution to infer
the message distribution.
Theorem 3. Let the attacker’s posterior probability distribution ρA over the
messages be
ρA(mi) =
oi + ρAI (mi)
o+ 1
where ρAI is the attacker’s prior. Then ρA tends to ρG as o→∞.
This allows the attacker to converge on the generator’s distribution by ob-
serving messages. Observe that the initial state before any observations yields
that ρA(mi) =
ρAI (mi)
1 which represents the attacker’s prior knowledge of the
distribution.
Now consider the case in which the attacker does not have access to the
messages, but only to the ciphertexts and the encoder function. We assume that
the key distribution is uniform, and further that the attacker is aware of this.
It is straightforward to adapt Theorem 3 to consider the ciphertexts instead
of messages. Here oi is instead the number of times a ciphertext ci has been
observed by the attacker and o the total number of ciphertexts observed. Also
let ρC be the actual probability distribution over the ciphertexts induced by
ρG, the key distribution, and the encoder function. Similarly let ρCI be the
prior ciphertext distribution calculated by the attacker before any observations
have taken place. Again, the attacker uses a Dirichlet distribution to infer the
ciphertext distribution.
Theorem 4. Let the attacker’s posterior probability distribution ρA over the
ciphertexts be
ρA(ci) =
oi + ρCI (ci)
o+ 1
.
Then ρA tends to ρC as o→∞.
The above result assumes the attacker does not adjust their prior after each
observation, however it is straightforward to reproduce the results with this
adaptation.
We now consider how the attacker can converge upon a message distribu-
tion by also exploiting the information gained from the encoder in the previous
section.
From the encoder function and key distribution we can define a function
Weight(m, c) that given a message m and ciphertext c gives a weighted proba-
bility of the message m having been encoded to c. Thus define Weight(m, c) =∑
k∈K ρ(k) . enc(m, k) = c. Intuitively Weight(m, c) is the likelihood consider-
ing of the message m to have been encoded to the ciphertext c.
Let wi be the sum of the Weight(mi, c)’s for all the observed ciphertexts
c. This will now be used to converge upon a message distribution. Intuitively
this is the same approach as used in Theorems 3 & 4 except now each observed
ciphertext is distributed over the possible messages that could have been used
to produce it (and weighted by the key distribution).
This approach allows the attacker to use a Dirichlet distribution to converge
on a distribution that satisfies the constraints of the encoder function and the
generator’s distribution (when the key space is less than the message space).
Theorem 5. Let the attacker’s posterior probability distribution ρA over the
messages be
ρA(mi) =
wi + ρAI (mi)
o+ 1
where ρAI is the attacker’s prior. When |K| < |M| then ρA tends to ρ′A as o→∞
such that ρ′A is a solution to the constraints induced by the encoder function.
Corollary 4. Let the attacker’s posterior probability distribution ρA over the
messages be
ρA(mi) =
wi + ρAI (mi)
o+ 1
where ρAI is the attacker’s prior. When |K| < |M| and |M| = rank(C) then ρA
tends to ρG as o→∞.
The above results rely upon the assumption that the key space is strictly less
than the message space, otherwise it is possible for the attacker’s distribution to
remain unchanged or even be made inaccurate. By taking |K| = |M| and using
a Latin encoder with uniform key distribution then the rank of the encoder
becomes 1 and so for any |K| > 1 there are an infinite of solutions, indeed this is
perfect secrecy or max-equivocation. For |K| > |M| consider when |K| = |M|+1;
then every ciphertext could have at least two keys mapping back to a particular
message m. This would eventually lead to more weight being given to m than any
other message, and converging on m being more likely than all others regardless
of other information.
All the results above focus upon the attacker inferring knowledge of the
message distribution, however they can be rephrased to instead infer information
about the key distribution by swapping the roˆles of key and message in the
results.
The above results show that if an encoder function has rank equal to the
message space then the attacker can uniquely determine the message distribu-
tion.
Consider again the encoder functions in Table 1 and the corresponding cipher-
text matrices in Figure 1 and assume that the keys and messages are uniformly
distributed. Then both encoder functions achieve max-equivocation for one-try
attack scenarios. However, the ciphertext matrix in Figure 1a has rank 3 and 3
possible messages, thus 3− 3 = 0 degrees of freedom, meaning that the attacker
can infer exactly the message distribution from the ciphertext distribution. On
the other hand the ciphertext matrix in Figure1b has rank 2, meaning that the
attacker will reduce the possible message distributions to an infinitude with a
single degree of freedom. While in this example one of the encoder is strictly bet-
ter than the other, often a trade-off between equivocation and degrees of freedom
is necessary. When the sender constructs the encoder function, they have to de-
cide whether a loss of equivocation in favor of an increase in degrees of freedom
is acceptable, evaluating what they know about the attacker’s knowledge of the
message distribution.
6 Curried Decoder Functions
In Sections 4 & 5 we have shown how knowledge of the encoder function can
be used by the attacker to infer information about the message distribution,
up to the number of degrees of freedom of the encoder function. Consequently,
this section considers defenses against this information leakage by the sender
not making an encoder function publicly known a priori. This can be easiest
understood by considering the scenario where the sender wishes to send exactly
one message to the receiver.
We consider when an encoder function is not fixed a priori and thus the
sender can produce an encoder function that is unknown to the attacker and
receiver. This implies that the sender communicates the produced encoder (or
equivalently, the decoder) function to the receiver. Consequently, the attacker
is assumed to intercept any communication of this encoder function, and so the
attacker and receiver have the same information about the encoder function.
A trivial approach is for the sender to transmit the entire encoder function to
the receiver. This solves the problem of decoding for the receiver, but discloses
the entire encoder to the attacker and reduces to the same information leakage
as in previous sections.
More interesting is to consider the advantages that can be gained by the
sender constructing the encoder function and being able to choose how much of
it to send.
One example of such advantages is to consider the possible encoders for a
message space M = {m1,m2,m3} and key space K = {k1, k2}. In particular
consider when ρG(m1) = 0.02 and ρG(m2) = 0.49 and ρG(m3) = 0.49 and
the encoder given in Table 1b. This encoder achieves the highest possible min-
entropy equivocation and also has one degree of freedom, making it the best
possible encoder for this message distribution. However, if the sender wishes
to send the message m1 then the leakage is total since all possible ciphertexts
reveal the message (and the key). This occurs because since m1 has only a 2%
probability of being transmitted, it is convenient to optimize the encoder for the
other 98% (that achieve max-equivocation). When only the message m1 is to be
transmitted, then the encoder in Table 1a achieves better equivocation for m1,
although it would be worse for m2 or m3.
The easiest scenario to consider is when the sender wishes to only send a single
message m from a message spaceM with associated generator’s distribution ρG
(with domain M). Clearly the sender has to transmit to the receiver sufficient
information to reconstruct the message from the shared key k from key space
K. This can be done with a curried decoder function d : K → M such that
d(k) = m.
Consider the set D of all possible curried decoder functions, i.e. all functions
from K to M. Assume a function pick : M× Dist(M) → Dist(D) producing
a probability distribution ρ(d|m) over each curried decoder d ∈ D such that
d(k) 6= m ⇒ ρ(d|m) = 0. Let D be a random variable representing the choice
of the decoder function. The sender then chooses a particular curried decoder d¯
according to ρ(D). The sender then transmits d¯ to the receiver as its ciphertext,
recall that d¯ is also intercepted by the attacker as usual. Note that the probability
distribution over D can be computed as ∀d ∈ D. ρ(d) = ∑m∈M ρ(d|m)ρG(m).
Then we can immediately derive an upper bound for
H∞(M |D) corresponding to max-equivocation.
Lemma 4. H∞(M |D) ≤ H∞(K).
In this scenario of sending a single message m using key k it is straightforward
to chose an encoder function that yields the ideal max-equivocation for c =
enc(m, k). This is possible since the encoder function need not be optimal (or
even particularly good) for any other message as discussed above. Observe that
when |K| = |M| and the key distribution is uniform then this coincides with
perfect secrecy and a one-time-pad.
To achieve the above results the naive pick function would map to a distri-
bution assigning probability 1 to the curried decoder maximizing equivocation
against an attacker knowing the generator’s distribution ρG. This kind of worst-
case assumption ensures that the attacker will not have a prior distribution
closer to the real one than the one assumed by the sender. However, the choice
of the curried decoder itself could reveal information about the message, which
is why we wish the pick function to produce a distribution over the decoders.
The following theorem computes the equivocation of the message depending on
the choice of the decoder.
Theorem 6. The expected message equivocation over all decoders can be com-
puted as
H∞(M |D) = − log
∑
d∈D
ρ(d) max
m∈M
ρ(m|d) (1)
where ρ(m|d) = ρ(d|m)ρG(m)ρ(d) .
The adaptation of Lemma 4 & Theorem 6 to entropy measures other than
min-entropy is straightforward.
7 ExPad
In this section we present an algorithm to create a decoder d for a given message
m achieving a good equivocation value by Theorem 6. That is, an algorithm that
produces a good curried decoder function for a particular message without the
choice of decoder revealing too much information about the message. Note that
the algorithm produces only a curried decoder function, and does not create a
complete encoder or decoder.
Data: message space M, message to transmit m ∈M, probability distribution
ρ(M), key space K, key k.
Result: curried decoder function d.
1 Let the ordered set O be the set M ordered by probability;
2 Let j be the position of m in O;
3 Choose an index i uniformly between max(0, j − |K|+ 1) and min(|O| − |K|, j);
4 Let d be the ordered set obtained by enumerating |K| elements of O starting
from index i included;
5 Randomize the order of the elements of d;
6 Switch the positions of element m and the element in position k in d;
7 Return d;
Algorithm 1: ExPad
7.1 The ExPad Algorithm
This section presents the ExPad algorithm and proves its effectiveness using the
results in Section 6. Note that uniform distribution over the key is assumed for
ExPad as presented here, although the algorithm can be adapted to account for
non-uniform key distribution also.
The ExPad algorithm produces a curried decoder function d : K → M,
represented as an ordered list of |K| messages such that the message to be sent
m is in position k of the list. Knowing the key k the receiver can immediately
decode the message.
Now, order the elements ofM according to their probability and denote this
ordered set by O. Let j be the position of m in O. We create the decoder d by
selecting a sequence of |K| elements from O including m. This ensures the prob-
abilities of the elements of d are relatively close, since this yields the closest to
uniform distribution and thus maximizes the equivocation. As explained in Sec-
tion 6 we cannot choose d to maximize the equivocation since this may uniquely
identify m. Instead ExPad exploits randomness here to make the choice of i.
Thus, denote with j the index of m and choose randomly an index i to begin
such that
max(0, j − |K|+ 1) ≤ i ≤ min(|M|, j) .
Then d consists of the first |K| elements of O starting from i. These elements
forming d are then randomly ordered into a sequence, with the element m fixed
at position k. That is, the number corresponding to the message at the position
of the value of the key. Now the curried decoder function d is this sequence. We
call this algorithm ExPad and summarize it as Algorithm 1.
Observe that ExPad produces a curried decoder function for transmission
of exactly one message. Extending to produce a sequence of curried decoder
functions for a sequence of messages (with or without sharing the same keys), is
a straightforward extension.
The next two sections consider an example of ExPad and then the message
equivocation, respectively.
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Fig. 2: Letters in the English language ordered by decreasing frequency.
7.2 ExPad Example
For a simple example, consider when the key is uniformly distributed over
K = {0, 1, 2, 3} and the message is a single letter from some English text (a-
z). Consider for simplicity the frequency of each letter in the English language
[18] as the prior probability distribution ρ(M), depicted in Fig. 2.
Assume that the sender wants to send the letter ’i’. The index j of character
’i’ in the ordered distribution is 4. Then the sender chooses an index i from 1 to
4 with uniform probability and builds d with |K| = 4 characters starting from
i. Since we have a probability distribution over the characters, we can compute
the entropy of each of the 4 possible ordered sets d. The possible sets d and their
induced vulnerabilities and min-entropy equivocations are shown in Table 2.
Table 2: Curried decoder functions and their induced vulnerability and min-
entropy equivocation for each index i in the ExPad example
d V (M |D = d) H∞(M |D = d)
In
d
e
x
i
1 taoi 0.2857 1.8073
2 aoin 0.2778 1.8473
3 oins 0.2724 1.8756
4 insh 0.2665 1.9076
Assume that i = 3 and k = 2. Then the sender takes the ordered set d =
{o, i, n, s}, puts the intended message ’i’ in position 2 and randomizes the order
of the remaining messages, obtaining e.g. C = {o, n, i, s}, and finally sends
the whole set d to the receiver. Knowing that k = 2 the receiver identifies the
message in position 2, i.e. ’i’, as the intended message.
7.3 Results for ExPad
The attacker intercepts the curried decoder function represented by d and tries
to guess the message. Clearly the message is one of the |K| elements of d. Since
the messages in d are ordered randomly, the probability of each of them being
the original message is 1/|K|, thus the message equivocation of the decoder would
be H∞(M |D = d) = H∞(K). However, as explained in Section 6, the choice of
the curried decoder itself reveals information about the message.
Let Md be the set of messages for which decoder d could be chosen. In
ExPad this corresponds to |K| elements of M that are adjacent in the ordered
set O. Then we can compute the expected equivocation for a decoder chosen by
the ExPad algorithm.
Lemma 5. ρ(m|d) = ρG(m)∑
m′∈Md ρG(m
′) .
Recall from Theorem 6 that
H∞(M |D) = − log
∑
d∈D
ρ(d) max
m∈M
ρ(m|d)
thus if ∀m ∈M, d ∈ D. ρ(m|d) = 1/|K| we would have H∞(M |D) = H∞(K).
SinceMd is composed of |K| elements ofM whose probability is close to m,
then ρ(m|d) = ρG(m)∑
m′∈Md ρG(m
′) is close to
1/|K|, and thus H∞(M |D) is close to
its upper bound of H∞(K).
For example, the results of this for Table 2 yields an expected min-entropy
equivocation of 1.8594, very close to 1.9076 bits of min-entropy equivocation
achieved by the best encoder.
This holds for the example if the message is ’i’ because the probabilities
around ’i’ are relatively smooth. For a character like ’d’, that is in a more
diverse part of the probability distribution, the entropies of the possible curried
decoder functions are lower; 1.6947 for ExPad with 1.8291 achieved by the best
encoder.
Note that if |M| > 2|K| − 2 there will be 2|K| − 2 messages that can be
mapped to less than |K| decoders, and will have a lower equivocation. However,
it typically holds that |M| >> |K| limiting the impact of this to a small number
of messages.
In general, the equivocation will depend on how smooth the probability dis-
tribution over the ordered set O is. It has been shown [7] that it is possible to pro-
duce an encoder function achieving H(M |C) = H(K) (or H∞(M |C) = H∞(K))
if and only if the message space M can be partitioned into subsets M1, . . .Mk
such that for each 1 ≤ i ≤ k it holds that |Mi| ≥ |K| and messages in Mi are
equiprobable. Otherwise, as an example consider the distribution ρ(bi) = 1/2i for
a 4-valued key. The distribution is very skewed, so for any element the message
equivocation is 0.9068 bits, not as close to the best encoders approaching 2 bits
as for the English letter example.
8 SHORTPAD
While ExPad achieves a high equivocation, it requires transmission of a cipher-
text linear in the size of the key space. In this section we present ShortPad,
an encryption algorithm able to achieve similar equivocation to ExPad while
transmitting a ciphertext logarithmic in the size of the key space.
8.1 The ShortPad Algorithm
The ShortPad algorithm assumes that the keys in K can be represented as bit
strings of some uniform length, here denoted |k|, and that |K| = 2|k|. Further,
also assume an operation  that treats the elements of M as a group. The
ShortPad algorithm exploits a pad consisting of an ordered set R of |k| pad
elements r1, . . . , r|k|. For a key k, let Rk be a subset of R consisting exactly of
the pad elements whose index corresponds to a 1 in the bit representation of k.
Define f to be the function that takes a seed element s ∈M and a subset of el-
ements ofM and applies to all these elements (in order), i.e. f(s, {m1, . . . ,mi}) =
sm1  . . .mi.
Observe that given a pad R and seed s the function f maps each Rk to some
element of M. Thus the choice of R and s induces the elements in the image of
f . ShortPad exploits this by choosing R and s such that image of f for these
yields good equivocation. Observe that the choice of R and s can be made in a
similar manner to the choice of messages to send in ExPad. The remainder of
ShortPad follows the same path, i.e. reducing to the |K| best possible pairs of
R and s given m and then choosing one uniformly at random.
Aside, observe that many pads can be easily discarded from consideration
due to relations within them that reduce equivocation. For example, if ri = rj
and i 6= j this will trivially reduce the equivocation (since the two keys whose bit
strings contain exactly one 1; at positions i and j will be equivalent) and so this
pad can be discarded. Similar properties may hold for multiple r’s depending
upon the operation .
Finally, the sender transmits the chosen pad R and seed s to the receiver
allowing them to determine the correct message m (via using f(s,Rk)). As usual
the attacker intercepts R and s.
Observe that the size of the pad is logarithmic in the size of the key space
rather than linear as for ExPad, and the size of the seed is constant.
In general fixing a particular operation  may have significant negative im-
pact on the equivocation. This can be addressed by having several operations
to choose from, and then specifying the chosen operation along with the pad
and seed. This is a straightforward extension, that requires the transmission of
a few extra bits to select from a potentially vast collection of operations, easily
yielding good equivocation results.
8.2 ShortPad Example
Since ShortPad can be considered a compressed variant of ExPad, this section
revisits the ExPad example from Section 7.2. Observe thatK = {0, 1, 2, 3} can
be represented as bit strings by K = {00, 01, 10, 11}, respectively. Again the
message is a single letter from some English text (a-z) with prior probability as
before. Let us assume that there is only one possible  here that is the sum of
the position of the letter in lexicographical order modulo 26.
Again assume that the sender wishes to send the letter ’i’ and the key is
2 = 10. Now the four best possible pad and seed pairs are shown in Table 3
along with their vulnerability and min-entropy. Here the index i is used simply
for the uniformly random choice of which pad and seed to use. Thus if the sender
randomly chooses i = 2 then they would send pad ’og’ and seed ’u’. Knowing that
k = 10 the receiver recognises that the message is sr1 = uo = (20+14)%26 =
8 = i.
Table 3: Pad and seed with their induced vulnerability and min-entropy equiv-
ocation in the ShortPad example
R s V (M |R, s) H∞(M |R, s)
In
d
e
x
i
1 qb s 0.2905 1.7831
2 og u 0.3215 1.6368
3 pb t 0.3276 1.6096
4 qg s 0.3296 1.6010
8.3 Results for ShortPad
The only delicacy in the results is to manage the distribution of 1’s and 0’s in
the bit string representations of the keys. This delicacy is elided by the condition
that |K| = 2|k|. Then the results for ShortPad can be derived as straightforward
adaptations of those for ExPad. The only other difference is in the manner of
choosing the possible “ciphertexts” to send; i.e. sets of messages for ExPad; and
pad, seed, and operator tuples for ShortPad. It is then straightforward to show
that R, s, and  are equivalent to d.
8.4 Message-Independent ShortPad
The ShortPad algorithm above has exploited the combination of pad, seed,
and operation to ensure particular values based upon the prior knowledge of the
message to be sent. However, the majority of the algorithm can be used in a
different manner that does not work only for a particular message. Observe that
the pad and operation can in fact be used for any possible message by changing
the choice of seed.
Recall the example in Section 8.2 where the message is ’i’. This was obtained
by the sender with s r1 = u o = (20 + 14)%26 = 8 = i. However, any other
message m′ could be obtained simply by changing s such that s u = m′.
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Fig. 3: Message-independent ShortPad example. The string s is produced as
the exclusive disjunction of the message m with the rows of r corresponding to
1s in the key k (in grey).
This coverage of the whole message space means that the pad and operation
can be used for any message. Indeed, the function f(·,Rk) can be considered
a decoder function with the seed s as the ciphertext. (The choice of pad and
operation could also be part of the ciphertext as above, but for simplicity we
consider them fixed here.) Thus by taking the inverse of this decoder function
we achieve an encoder function that operates over the whole message space.
In the same manner that a number of operations can be fixed before hand and
then indexed, a selection of pads and operations that yield good equivocation
results for different subsets of the message space can be fixed in advance. This
again reduces the information transmitted from logarithmic to a constant to
determine the index of such a pad and operation pair.
This in some sense returns to the scenario where the encoders (now many
possible encoders) are known to the attacker since the pad and operation com-
binations are already fixed. Thus, we could fix a single pad and operation to
achieve the initial conditions of a known encoder, or balance the transmission
cost of choosing from many possible encoders (i.e. pad and operation pairs) by
sending the index of the chosen encoder. This essentially becomes a trade-off
between pre-computing many possible encoders and looking up the best of the
options, compared to computing the best possible encoder at transmission time.
In either scenario the leakage can be quantified using the techniques presented
in this paper.
Example Assume the following 4 × 6 pad r with degree 4 and no repeated
columns, which has been pre-shared among all parties:
r =

r1 1 1 0 1 1 0
r2 1 0 1 1 0 1
r3 1 1 1 0 1 0
r4 1 0 0 1 1 1
 .
Let m = 000111 and k = 0101. Since the second and fourth bits of the key are
ones, we produce the bit string s as the exclusive disjunction ⊕ of the message
m with the second and fourth rows of r:
s = m⊕ r2 ⊕ r4
= 000111⊕ 101101⊕ 100111
= 001101
and we transmit s to the receiver. The example is also depicted in Figure 3.
9 Conclusions
We have considered several scenarios where an attacker attempts to gain infor-
mation about a message or message distribution. We have shown that a one-try
attack by an attacker with a different message distribution to the generator can
only do worse than knowing the generator’s distribution. This can be quantified
as the relative vulnerability when using a different distribution.
We have shown that knowledge of the encoder function can yield informa-
tion about the generator’s message distribution. In particular, when the matrix
representation of the encoder function has maximal rank, then there is a unique
distribution that can be revealed with knowledge of the ciphertext distribution.
Otherwise, when the rank is not maximal then each decrease in rank induces an
infinitude of possible message distributions.
We show that the attacker can converge upon the ciphertext distribution
by observing transmissions, when the encoder function is fixed regardless of the
key(s) used. Combining this with the information from the encoder function, the
attacker can converge on a message distribution that satisfies constraints induced
by the encoder function. Further, when the matrix representation has maximal
rank the attacker can converge upon the generator’s distribution. Thus, when
the attacker does not know the generator’s distribution, maximizing equivocation
alone may not be optimal since reduced matrix rank can prevent convergence to
the generator’s distribution.
We show that an encoder function need not be fixed, and revealed, in advance
and so can be constructed by the sender as required. This allows for transmission
of a curried decoder function that reveals less information about the distribution
since much of the encoder function is never available to the attacker. Indeed,
when sending only a small number of messages the encoder function cannot be
fully available and so the matrix rank cannot be determined by the attacker.
These curried decoder functions can be exploited to choose ones that maximize
equivocation for the message(s) to be sent, optimizing for them rather than all
possible messages. Although optimizing too strongly can leak information by
indicating which message the optimization has been for.
The ExPad algorithm is presented as a straightforward approach to achiev-
ing high equivocation and sending a curried decoder function. We show that
ExPad can achieve high equivocation for any particular message, not being lim-
ited like a traditional encoder function that must balance equivocation for all
messages.
The ShortPad algorithm is presented as a way to reduce the data transmis-
sion volume required for ExPad while maintaining good equivocation properties.
We show that the approach used in ShortPad could be exploited by pre-sharing
several pads and choosing the best one when transmitting a message, reducing
the transmission volume further.
Future Work
This paper makes several assumptions that can be relaxed to consider alternative
scenarios, attacks, and defences.
Unknown Message Spaces We have assumed that the message space is perfectly
known to all parties. However, there are scenarios where the message space may
not be perfectly known to some parties. For example, the sender and receiver
may have knowledge of their message space, while the attacker may be unaware
or have some superset. In this case the attacker does not have a (straightforward)
probability distribution over the messages.
If the sender and receiver can agree upon an indexing of the messages, then
transmitting only the index prevents the attacker from recovering any informa-
tion about the message. However, this becomes a security through obscurity
scenario and any security guarantee upon it becomes completely dependent on
the attacker not having information about the message space.
Infinite Message Spaces The message space here is considered finite, and al-
though the results apply for any finite message space, in practice it may be
more elegant to work over an infinite message space. This would allow results
for transmission of extremely large files (e.g. Blu-ray movies) with good equiv-
ocation without needing to find encoders over all possible files. In this case we
can assume that the attacker’s knowledge is represented by a function mapping
every finite subset of the message space to a probability distribution on that
subset.
The sender can produce and send a curried decoder function as explained
in Section 6, reducing the message space to the image of this curried decoder.
Message equivocation can be computed as normal. While prior entropy and thus
leakage would be convoluted to compute in this scenario, equivocation-based
principles like the ones presented in this paper apply directly.
Stream Ciphers An alternative to considering such extreme message spaces
would be to consider stream cipher variants of the results and algorithms pre-
sented here and in the related work. It may be that good equivocation can
be achieved for stream ciphers that do not require reasoning over impractically
large message spaces. The message-independent ShortPad variant can be easily
modified to encode a stream, particularly when using a block-by-block operation
like the exclusive disjunction example in Section 8.4.
Misleading the Attacker Another path of exploration is to consider how the
cryptosystem may not merely defend against attacks, but actively mislead an
attacker to gain false information. This is mentioned briefly as a possibility when
large key spaces are available (in Section 5), but other techniques also show some
promise. When the sender and receiver share some information (beyond the key)
unknown to the attacker this could be exploited. For example, if there are invalid
messages in the message space, these could be sent in place of valid messages,
leading the attacker to believe they are valid and thus converge to an incorrect
distribution over the message space.
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Omitted Proofs
The proofs of all non-trivial lemmata and theorems in the paper follow.
Omitted from Section 3
Proof (of Lemma 2).
V (G)− δ(G  A)
= ρG(m
ρG)−
∑
m∈M\
ρG(m
ρG)− ρG(m)
|MρA |
= ρG(m
ρG)− 1|MρA |
|M\|ρG(mρG)− ∑
m∈M\
ρG(m)

= ρG(m
ρG)− |M
\|
|MρA |ρG(m
ρG) +
1
|MρA |
∑
m∈M\
ρG(m)
= ρG(m
ρG)
(
1− |M
\|
|MρA |
)
+
1
|MρA |
∑
m∈M\
ρG(m)
= ρG(m
ρG)
(
|M∩|
|MρA |
)
+
1
|MρA |
∑
m∈M\
ρG(m)
=
1
|MρA |
|M∩|ρG(mρG) + ∑
m∈M\
ρG(m)

= V (G  A) .
Proof (of Lemma 3).
V (G|X)− δ(G  A|X)
=
∑
x∈X
ρG(x)V (G|x)−
∑
x∈X
ρG(x)δ(G|x  A|x)
=
∑
x∈X
ρG(x) (V (G|x)− δ(G|x  A|x))
=
∑
x∈X
ρG(x)V (G|x  A|x) (by Lemma 2)
= V (G  A|X) .
Proof (of Theorem 1).
H∞(G  A|X)−H∞(G|X)
= − log V (G  A|X) + log V (G|X)
= log
V (G|X)
V (G  A|X)
= log
V (G|X)
V (G|X)− δ(G  A|X) (by Lemma 3)
and the result follows.
Omitted from Section 4
Proof (of Theorem 2). Each degree of freedom allows an infinitude of message
distributions, conclude by Rouche´-Capelli.
Omitted from Section 5
Proof (of Theorem 3). The posterior probability distribution over X is a Dirich-
let distribution Dir(α) where α = {α1, . . . , α|M|} and αi = oi+1. The expected
value of Xi is
αi
α0
= oi+ρAI (mi)o+1 . Conclude by convergence of Dirichlet distribution
to the sampled distribution.
Proof (of Theorem 4). The posterior probability distribution over X is a Dirich-
let distribution Dir(α) where α = {α1, . . . , α|M|} and αi = oi+1. The expected
value of Xi is
αi
α0
= oi+ρCI (ci)o+1 . Conclude by convergence of Dirichlet distribution
to the sampled distribution.
Proof (of Theorem 5). The probability distribution over X is a Dirichlet distri-
bution Dir(α) where α = {α1, . . . , α|M|} and αi = di+1. The expected value of
Xi is
αi
α0
= di+ρAI (mi)o+1 . Conclude by convergence of Dirichlet distribution to the
sampled distribution. That this satisfies the constraints of the encoder function
is by construction.
Proof (of Corollary 4). By Rouche´-Capelli there is exactly one solution and so
this must coincide with that of the generator.
Omitted from Section 6
Proof (of Lemma 4). Note that since each d ∈ D is a function d : K →M then
H∞(M |D = d) ≤ H∞(K) therefore H∞(M |D) ≤ H∞(K).
Proof (of Theorem 6). Trivial from the definition of conditional min-entropy.
Omitted from Section 7
Proof (of Lemma 5). Note that m /∈Md ⇒ ρ(d|m) = 0 by definition of the pick
function. Therefore we compute ρ(d) as
ρ(d) =
∑
m∈M
ρ(m, d)
=
∑
m∈Md
ρ(m, d)
=
∑
m∈Md
ρG(m)ρ(d|m)
=
1
|K|
∑
m∈Md
ρG(m)
and for each message m we compute ρ(m|d) with Bayes’ theorem as
ρ(m|d) = ρ(d|m)ρG(m)
ρ(d)
=
1
|K|ρG(m)
1
|K|
∑
m′∈Md ρG(m
′)
=
ρG(m)∑
m′∈Md ρG(m
′)
.
